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Paul Ricoeur’s critique of social emancipatory projects that claim to be 
absolutely radical sets the stage for my investigation into the exemplary 
value of esteemed moral and political acts. Like works of art, such acts 
reform or revolutionize praxis through refashioning the world from 
within. By placing textual hermeneutics under the theme of the increase 
in being evinced by the work of art, Ricoeur’s analysis on the way that 
metaphor as a work in miniature iconically augments reality forges a link 
between the imagination’s productive power and the “law of 
superabundance.”  This law inheres in the logic of hope. The hope of the 
“not yet” and the “much more” thus draws support from exemplary acts 
that bear the mark of the future through testifying to the reign of 
goodness, generosity, courage and love. 
However, Ricoeur’s claim that an eschatology of nonviolence 
constitutes the critique of ideology’s ultimate philosophical horizon 
raises a question concerning this eschatology’s theological equivalent. 
Ricoeur maintains that the projection of the task of actualizing freedom 
is the philosophical equivalent of a theology of hope. This theology draws  
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its meaning from the “hope of things to come” based on the 
eschatological event. Correlatively, this task’s ethico-political impulse 
takes root in hope’s practical and existential necessity, which inheres in 
the structure of action. The hope of as yet unfulfilled expectations and 
demands ignites the passion for the possible and fuels the will and the 
desire to intervene in the world’s course. In contrast to the contagion of 
violence and evil, moral and political acts’ exemplary value stands as a 
demonstration and proof of hope. The theme of the increase in being that 
rules over textual hermeneutics consequently has a practical counterpart 
in the task that an eschatology of nonviolence adopts as its own, namely, 
the task of actualizing freedom within the historical reality of 
humankind.  
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he question I propose to take up today is: Does Paul Ricoeur’s 
eschatology of nonviolence rest on theological presuppositions 
regarding the “end times” and the promise of salvation?1 Although 
Ricoeur refers to this eschatology in the context of a critique of 
emancipatory social projects that claim to be absolutely radical, the 
word “eschatology” itself has obvious theological resonances. The 
question then is whether the confrontation between the critique of  




1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international conference “Paul Ricoeur 
in Asia: Reflections on Society, Politics, and Religion,” which was cohosted by the Ateneo de 
Manila University and the University of Santo Tomas, November 19–21, 2015. I would especially 
like to express my gratitude to Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia, the conference convenor, for inviting me 
to participate.  
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recourse to an eschatology of nonviolence as the horizon of 
practical reason’s ethical and political aims. We cannot discount the 
suspicion that this eschatology harbors some secret teleological 
presumption that goodness, justice, and righteousness will prevail. 
In this case, this teleological presumption would be nothing less 
than the principal guarantor of the promise of salvation. I am no 
theologian, so I will leave the question of the promise of salvation’s 
eschatological significance to those more qualified to address it. 
Instead, I propose to adopt a more pragmatic approach. I will 
therefore take the idea that an eschatology of nonviolence constitutes 
the ultimate philosophical horizon of the critique of ideology as the 
critical touchstone concerning some secret teleological or onto-
theological ambition. 
An Eschatology of Nonviolence 
The critique of ideology’s ultimate philosophical horizon takes 
shape against the backdrop of ideology critique’s confrontation with 
the priority that Hans Georg-Gadamer gives the experience of 
belonging to history and being affected by it. This confrontation 
between a hermeneutics of prior belonging and the critique of 
ideology’s emancipatory ambitions highlights the wager Ricoeur 
makes when he set an eschatology of nonviolence against an 
ontology of lingual understanding. 2  Ricoeur’s intervention in the 
debate between Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas is well known. 




2 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, 
trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 87; see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1989). 




affected by history is the ground of all understanding. Conversely, 
Habermas insists that no dialogical effort to overcome 
misunderstanding can ferret out the systemic distortions of 
communicative relations that operate behind our backs. Ricoeur 
resolves the impasse that arises from setting the hermeneutics of 
tradition against the hermeneutics of suspicion by insisting on the 
necessity of a critical detour that exposes ideology’s systemic 
distortions of communicative relations. This critical detour, 
however, fundamentally alters the terms of the dialectic in which 
Ricoeur locates the tension between the hermeneutics of tradition’s 
conservative function and the critique of ideology’s emancipatory 
one. As a result, an eschatology of freedom supplants the critique of 
ideology in the critique of ideology’s antagonistic relation with the 
ontology of lingual understanding. 
The stakes of the wager Ricoeur makes in construing this 
dialectic in this way are considerable. By tying the problem of 
freedom’s actualization to the critique of ideology’s emancipatory 
thrust, he in effect throws a bridge across the chasm separating the 
imagination’s power of invention—which we typically identify with 
the realm of aesthetic judgment—from the regions in which 
practical reason operates. As we know, Ricoeur developed his theory 
of imagination in part in the context of his analysis of the semantic 
innovation that leads to the creation of meaning within the 
metaphorical process. For example, the semantic impertinence in 
the metaphorical statement “The peace process is on the ropes” 
puts into play predicative tensions between the subject “peace 
process” and modifying references to a boxing match. Placing terms 
belonging to different semantic fields in proximity in this way 
introduces a semantic clash at the literal level. The image of being 
pummeled by one’s opponent and clinging to ropes for support in a 
last desperate attempt to stay on one’s feet is a vivid one. Tying this 




image to diplomatic negotiations, where courtesy and civility are the 
rule, is incongruous at best. The metaphorical attribution of this 
image of brute violence to the process of negotiating a peace 
settlement resolves the initial semantic impertinence through 
mutually enlarging the respective semantic fields of each term. The 
metaphorical operation, we could say, schematizes this predicative 
assimilation of nonliteral attributes in the emergence of a new 
meaning. Or as Ricoeur summarizes: “Imagination is the 
apperception, the sudden insight of a new predicative pertinence, 
specifically a pertinence within impertinence”3 in the thickness of the 
metaphoric scene. 
Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, however, also has a place 
in his explorations of the imagination’s productive as well as its 
beguiling power. In his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, Ricoeur is 
specifically concerned with the cultural and social imagination. 
Ricoeur’s investigations are motivated in part by the fact that 
sociological diagnoses of social ills do not in themselves explain how 
the illness works. How, Ricoeur therefore asks, can a social interest 
be “expressed” in “a thought, an image, or a concept of life”?4 The 
regressive analysis he undertakes reaches a limit with the 
constitution of the social bond. Ricoeur’s genetic phenomenology 
points up the fact that there is no non-symbolic mode of existence 
where human beings are concerned. It is only by reason of the 




3  Paul Ricoeur, A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991), 125. 
4 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 10. Ricoeur argues that despite the value that diagnostic critiques of these 
ills have, such critiques leave open the question as to how ideas arise from praxis by overlooking 
the immediately symbolic dimension of the practical field of experiences. 




interpreted through images and ideas that mask real interests and 
power relations. Accordingly, Ricoeur shows how the concept of 
ideology inherited from Marx is necessarily grafted onto the 
ideological phenomenon’s integrative function, which in turn 
accounts for the fundamentally symbolic structure of all social life.5 
Placing ideology and utopia within the same framework 
highlights the social and cultural imagination’s double-edged power. 
On the one hand, the imagination plays a formative role in 
constituting the system of symbolic mediations that give a figure and 
a body to a cultural way of life. At the same time, the imagination’s 
eccentric function is manifest in the way that possible alternatives 
rework the real from within. (Ricoeur’s theory of mimesis similarly 
underscores the power that works of art have to refashion the real in 
accordance with the worlds that they project, a theory to which I 
will return shortly.6) On the other hand, the imagination can also 
bewitch us, as when dissimulating images mask systemic abuses of 
power or when dreams of unfulfilled pleasures and desires, or the 
fascination with dystopic variations become a means of pathological 
escape. 
The power that the imagination has when it comes to revitalizing 
the practical order of everyday life indicates the critical point of 
contact between a theory developed in the context of language’s  
 
 
5 Ibid., 260 ff. Ricoeur explains that “[i]t may be that our regressive analysis can go no further, 
because no group and no individual are possible without this integrative function” (ibid., 258). 
Hence “[w]e must integrate the concept of ideology as distortion into a framework that recognizes 
the symbolic structure of social life. Unless social life has a symbolic structure, there is no way to 
understand how we live, do things and project these activities in ideas, no way to understand how 
reality can become an idea or how real life can produce illusions” (ibid., 8). This symbolic structure 
is therefore always already at work in the “most primitive kind of action” (ibid., 8; see ibid., 311). 
6  Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); see Ricoeur, A Ricoeur Reader. Mimesis, Ricoeur 
explains, “does not equate itself with something already given. Rather it produces what it imitates, 
if we continue to translate mimesis by ‘imitation’” (ibid., 138). Mimesis is accordingly “no longer a 
reduplication of reality but a creative rendering of it” (ibid., 133). 




productive potential (i.e., a tensive theory of metaphor) and one that 
sets ideology and utopia within the same conceptual framework. In a 
way, this point of contact rests on the strength of a philosophical 
insight that accounts for our capacity to break with accepted 
practices and habits of thought in order to pursue different courses 
of action. As such, the power of invention that we recognize is at 
work in literary fictions, creative works of art and musical 
compositions is also the condition for reforming or revolutionizing 
praxis.7 Ricoeur’s critique of emancipatory social projects that claim 
to be absolutely radical reserves a place for this power of invention. 
The idea that such an emancipatory social project rids itself of 
prejudices, contingencies, and historical constraints ostensibly 
exempts the social theorist from being affected by the conditions 
and exigencies that she denounces. However, the kind of totalizing 
reflection that such a critique entails is a theoretical as well as a 
practical impossibility. Our capacity to intervene in the world’s 
affairs and to alter its course depends in part on our situation as well 
as on our powers of invention. In turn, the power of invention—
which I will relate to the exercise of good judgment in situation—
rescues emancipatory social projects from this theoretical and 
practical impossibility. Hence the wager, namely, that setting an 
eschatology of nonviolence in place of the critique of ideology as the 
latter’s ultimate philosophical horizon creates a bridge between the 
imagination’s operative force and the task with which Ricoeur 
charges practical reason. 
 
7  Different attempts to rehabilitate the aesthetic attest to the fact that this power is the 
condition for reforming praxis. At the same time, we need to account for aesthetic experience’s 
transposition onto the plane of ethics and politics in order to give a full account of the 
imagination’s productive role in social and political life. See for example George Levine, ed., 
Aesthetics and Ideology (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1994); Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990). 




Consequently, the idea that an eschatology of nonviolence 
constitutes the critique of ideology’s proper philosophical horizon 
does not harbor any de facto theological assumptions. We are all 
aware that the term “eschatology” is itself replete with religious and 
theological overtones. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
eschatology as: “[t]he branch of theology that deals with the four last 
things (death, judgement, heaven, and hell) and the final destiny of 
the soul and of humankind; [or as] a doctrine or belief about the 
Second Coming or the kingdom of God.” To be sure, millennialist 
doctrines can take a decidedly secular turn. Ernst Bloch’s principle 
of hope is a case in point. Bloch clearly ties this principle to the 
driving spirit of utopian ventures. For him, this spirit feeds on “not 
yet” realized potentialities and possibilities fomenting in the hollow 
space of the present. Bloch recognizes the risk that humanity’s 
historical odyssey toward a utopian homeland might end in disaster.8 
And yet, his confidence that Marxism is the true “quartermaster of 
the future”9 strips this chiliastic principle of hope of its practical 
anchorages. Ricoeur reminds us that Adorno’s philosophical stance, 
“which [although it] knows perfectly well how to recognize evil” 10 
loses itself in its relentlessly negative dialectical attack. In Bloch’s 
case in contrast, “the critique of critiques projects the ‘principle of 




8 See Theodor W. Adorno and Ernst Bloch, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between 
Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing,” in Ernst Bloch, 
The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1988), 3. 
9 Ernst Bloch, Principle of Hope, vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 1368. “[O]nly Marxism has given rise to the theory-practice of a 
better world” (ibid., 1370). 
10 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 226. 
11 Ibid. 




negative dialectic and Bloch’s principle of hope fail to preserve the 
tension between the space of our experience and the horizon of our 
expectations from rupturing schismatically. From this vantage point, 
Ricoeur’s critique of the failure of social emancipatory projects that 
purport to be absolutely radical drives home the challenge of 
conceiving how an eschatology of nonviolence responds to this 
failure without itself falling prey to teleological or theological 
presuppositions.12 
 Before I go on to explain why I think that the wager Ricoeur 
makes regarding the imagination’s power is indicative of the stakes 
in this critique of emancipatory social projects that purport to be 
absolutely radical, I would like to offer a few comments as to why 
Ricoeur distances himself from the kind of totalizing reflection to 
which the claim to be absolutely radical succumbs. The temptation 
of thought to elevate itself to the level of the absolute through 
“grasping history as the totalization of time in the eternal present”13 
is reason enough to guard against the allure of this kind of totalizing 
reflection. Conversely, the fascination with deconstructing every 
claim to truth effectively abandons the hopes of emancipatory social 
projects to the sempiternal dissolution of their intentions and aims. 
Ricoeur cautions us about the necessity of avoiding this Hegelian 
temptation while renouncing the Nietzschean love of destiny and 
the amor fati.14 Instead, he maintains that we have to preserve the 
tension between the space of our experiences and the horizon of 




12 For a related critique of philosophies of history’s teleological ambitions, see Hannah Arendt, 
The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2005). 
13 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 193. 
14  Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 206. 




the space of experience—a meta-category of historical thought that 
Ricoeur borrows from Reinhardt Koselleck’s semantic analysis—
refers to the stratified structure of a habitus, the space of which can 
be traversed in different ways following a multitude of itineraries.15 
On the other hand, the horizon of expectation forms the contours 
of unfulfilled aspirations, claims, and demands. Expectations are 
thus inscribed in the present. Hence expectation is the “future-
become-present (vergegenwärtige Zukunft), turned toward the not-
yet.”16 
In view of our own historical situation and the political, social, 
and humanitarian crises that abound, we may believe we have every 
reason to think that the distance separating us from better times is 
virtually insurmountable. We may even believe it is already too late 
to prevent the tension between the space of our experiences and the 
horizon of our expectations from rupturing completely. However, 
holding to such a belief means renouncing the practical task that lies 
at the heart of any emancipatory project along with this task’s 
permanent ethical and political implications. Ultimately, this task is 
inseparable from the challenge of actualizing freedom within 
humanity’s historical reality.17 This task and this challenge set the 
aim of an eschatology of nonviolence in relief. Can we then 
renounce this eschatology without abandoning all hope of 
overcoming the social, cultural, and geopolitical ills that cast the 






15 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 208. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 210. 




Exemplarity and Iconic Augmentation 
The question concerning the hope of a better and more just 
future is critically decisive. For it marks a watershed that separates 
the critique of ideology’s philosophical horizon from the claims of 
emancipatory social projects to extricate themselves from the 
circumstances and conditions in which the social theorist invariably 
is caught up. The wager that inheres in setting an eschatology of 
nonviolence in place of the critique of ideology underscores the 
force of the convictions that inform the initiatives that we take in 
response to the doubts and uncertainties that beset us. Conversely, 
the institution of normative ideals that would govern a prescribed 
course of action in advance raises the question concerning the 
source, origin, or ground of normative precepts. I by no means want 
to suggest that we should jettison the normative value of the claims 
different individuals, groups, communities, and nations make. 
However, we need to recognize that in ultrapluralistic societies as in 
our current global geopolitical environment, these claims’ 
foundational values are multiple and conflicted. I will set aside for 
the moment the question concerning the kind of universality we 
might assign to claims springing from the soil of different cultural 
systems, convictions, and beliefs. Instead, I will focus on the wager 
that I think distinguishes an eschatology of freedom from projects 
that succumb to the temptation of a totalizing reflection. 
The question that immediately comes to the fore is whether the 
eschatological standpoint that rests on the wager I have suggested 
inheres in this standpoint can be justified or at least accounted for 
independently of some secret onto-theological foundation. As I said 
earlier, the stakes are high. Replacing the claim of an emancipatory 
social project to be absolutely radical with its theological equivalent 
merely covers over the practical challenge that I am trying to 
uncover. This challenge is indeed an eminently practical one, since it 




concerns how we are able to respond to the demands of difficult 
situations in cases where there are no prescriptive guidelines or rules 
that are adequate. We all recognize that the capacity to exercise good 
judgment in these difficult situations is related to the virtue that 
Aristotle called phronesis.18 In this respect, we could say that phronesis 
is akin to an act of genius, in that in responding to the demands of 
the situation we have to invent as much as discover the appropriate 
solution. The fittingness of the action we take is the demonstration 
and proof of the act’s judicious character. The act’s fittingness vis-à-
vis what the situation requires thus stands as a testament to this 
singular act’s exemplary value. 
The kinship between an exemplary moral or political act and the 
work of art’s power to refashion the real from within authorizes us 
to pursue the idea that our capacity to respond to the demands of a 
situation is the ground and support of the wager that Ricoeur makes. 
Aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics 
and politics underscores the affinity between this capacity for 
discovering the best or sometimes the least objectionable solution 
and the artist’s creative power. This extraordinary power of 
invention also resides in the artist’s “capacity to respond in a 
singular manner to the singular nature of the question.” 19  The 
enigma of artistic creation consists in the fact that the artist’s 
experience, which provokes or ignites this response, is itself 
incommunicable. Only when this experience takes the form of a 
problem to be resolved is the artist’s power of imagination set to 
work. Ricoeur accordingly emphasizes that: 
 
18 See Paul Ricoeur, The Just, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 154. 
19 Paul Ricoeur, François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, Critique and Conviction: Conversations with 
François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1998), 178. 




Something of… [the artist’s] experience, precisely 
because it has been carried by a work, is going to be 
able to be communicated. Her naked experience as 
such was incommunicable; but, as soon as it can be 
problematized in the form of a singular question which 
is adequately answered in the form of a response that is 
singular as well, then it acquires communicability. The 
work iconically augments the lived experience, 
inexpressible, incommunicable, closed upon itself. It is 
this iconic augmentation, as augmentation, that is 
communicable.20  
What, then, does Ricoeur mean when he says that the work 
iconically augments the artist’s lived experience? We might be 
tempted to think that he is suggesting that the work is a conduit for 
expressing the artist’s thoughts, ideas, feelings, and intentions. 
Nothing, I think, could be further from the truth. We only need 
recall that within the context of Ricoeur’s textual hermeneutics, the 
only privilege the author enjoys when it comes to interpreting her 
text is that she is in the position of being its first reader. How then 
should we understand Ricoeur’s claim that the work iconically 
augments the lived experience in the aftermath of the destruction of 
the intentionalist fallacy along with psychologizing and Romantic 
conceits? Only one avenue seems open to us: to recognize that only 
the experience occasioned by the work in response to the question, 
problem or crisis as the artist apprehends it is communicable. 
The idea that a work iconically augments our, or the artist’s, 
experience is itself initially puzzling. Fortunately, we can take  
 
 
20 Ibid., 179. 




Ricoeur’s account of the metaphorical process as a guide. As we 
know, Ricoeur critiques theories that regard metaphor as a simply 
decorative substitution for a less poetic term or word. His tensive 
theory emphasizes the emergence in language of a new meaning, as I 
explained earlier in relation to the example I gave: “The peace 
process is on the ropes.” In this example, likening the peace process 
to a fighter who is all but defeated enables us to see the peace 
process as being “on the ropes” despite the distance and the 
difference between the respective semantic fields of these two 
terms. Accordingly, the icon is the matrix of the new predicative 
pertinence that resolves the initial semantic clash. The predicative 
assimilation of nonliteral attributes produces the image that arises 
from the metaphorical statement’s literal ruins. This image is the 
concrete milieu in which the meaning schematized by the 
predicative assimilation can be heard, felt, and read. The matrix of 
metaphorical attribution thus displays the intended image in the 
thickness of the imagining scene. The enigma of iconic presentation 
springs from the way that an emergent meaning arises from the 
predicative impertinence that sets the imagination to work. 
Consequently, we resolve this enigma by grasping the intended 
meaning depicted by the icon.21  Just as a plot “functions as the 
narrative matrix” 22  of the stories that we tell, the icon is the 
“schematization of metaphorical attribution.” 23  In the case of 
metaphor, the schematization of the new predicative pertinence is 
 
21 Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling,” in On 
Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 148. 
22 Ricoeur, A Ricoeur Reader, 105. 
23 Ibid., 126: “Metaphor is the figure of style which enables the preparatory stage to interrupt 
the conceptual formation because, in the metaphorical process, the movement towards the genre 
is arrested by the resistance of the difference and, in some way, intercepted by the figure of 
rhetoric. Imagination thus identified is undoubtedly the productive, schematizing imagination.” 




the engine of the metaphor’s redescription of the real in the light of 
its heuristic fiction.24 
The metaphor’s emergent meaning clearly depends upon the 
imagination’s operative role. The image of a peace process that has 
taken a brutal pummeling and is on the verge of collapse is one that 
is figured in language. Here imagination is at work in drawing out 
the resemblance between two dissimilar terms. Imagination, Ricoeur 
therefore tells us, is at work in the process through which a new 
metaphorical meaning emerges from the ruins of a literal one, as I 
just indicated. The imagination’s productive force is manifest in the 
metaphorical statement’s schematization of the new predicative 
pertinence. Hence Ricoeur identifies imagination with its productive, 
schematizing power.  
I think that Ricoeur’s remarks on the productive imagination and 
metaphor’s schematization of an emergent meaning help clarify why 
he says that the artist’s experience is communicable only in terms of 
its iconic augmentation. To the degree that this experience is 
necessarily mediated by the way it takes shape in a work, it only 
acquires a form of expression in answer to a question, problem or 
crisis as the artist understands it.25 The work, however, stands by 
itself in terms of its power to project a world that each of us could 
make our own. 26  Like the icon that schematizes an emergent  
 
 
24 The icon thus constitutes the matrix that sustains the dynamic tension between a figurative 
meaning that resolves the predicative impertinence (the metaphorical is) and the metaphor’s 
literally nonsensical meaning (the literal is not). This tension is the spring of metaphor’s power of 
redescription. 
25 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 162: “If a work is considered as the resolution of a 
problem, itself arising out of prior successes in the field of science as well as in the field of art, 
then style may be termed the adequation between the singularity of the solution, which the work 
constitutes by itself, and the singularity of the crisis situation as this was apprehended by the 
thinker or artist.” 
26 This power is the condition of the work’s hermeneutical autonomy. 




meaning, the experience occasioned by a work is one that each 
spectator, reader, or listener apprehends herself. The work confronts 
each spectator, reader or listener with the task and the challenge of 
grasping the “thought” or the “idea” expressed by the work. Similar 
to metaphor’s redescription of the real, the work’s mimetic 
refiguration of our ways of thinking and feeling iconically augments 
the practical field of our everyday experiences. It is only through 
augmenting our ways of inhering in the world that the force of the 
work makes itself felt. We cannot therefore separate the work’s 
ontological vehemence—by which I mean the increase in being 
effected by a work’s renewal of the real in accordance with the 
world that it projects—from the communicability of the experience 
occasioned by the work.  
Ricoeur’s insight that the work’s iconic augmentation of the 
artist’s experience is communicable only as augmentation provides a 
crucial key to understanding how the work’s exemplarity figures in 
the claim it makes. In light of the way that the experience 
occasioned by a work iconically augments the real, the claim made 
by a work through projecting an imaginary world that holds out 
other possibilities with regard to the ways we conduct ourselves and 
inscribe our lives in the web of living together is the emblem of the 
work’s exemplary value. Ricoeur reminds us that every proposal of 
meaning is at the same time a claim to truth. The clash between a 
work’s fictive world and systemically frozen outlooks and habits of 
thought bears out the work’s ontological weight in giving a figure 
and a body to different sensibilities, aspirations, and outlooks. We 
might be tempted to think that the work is exemplary only if we are 
convinced that the alternative aesthetically prefigured by the work 
represents a better or more just way of living. However, tragedy can 
also be exemplary, as when it instructs us in the fragility of a wisdom 
forced to decide between irreconcilably conflicting demands. We 




could therefore say more generally that the work’s response to a 
crisis, question or conundrum carries the force of a conviction that 
takes shape in the claim emanating from a work. This conviction can 
no more be credited to the artist’s intentions than can the meaning 
that the work holds for us, as Adorno made clear in his accusation 
against art’s tendentious politicization.27  Rather, the force of this 
conviction belongs to the work’s power to break open congealed 
habits and practices by refashioning the world from within. The 
work’s exemplarity bears the mark of this power. Through setting 
out alternatives that we could follow by making them our own, the 
work opens a path into the heart of the real through transfiguring 
our ways of inhering in the world from within. 
I would like to offer one more comment that anticipates the final 
part of my presentation, in which I will explore whether there is a 
place for a law of superabundance in an eschatology that ostensibly 
eschews any theological foundation. The work’s exemplarity 
provides an initial indication as to whether such a law might figure 
in a philosophical understanding of the logic of hope. Transposing 
aesthetic experience onto the ethical and political planes highlights 
the affinity between exemplary works and moral and political acts 
that we admire. Like works that reply to a question, aporia, or 
problem in a poetic mode, exemplary moral and political acts answer 
the demands of different situation in ways that we deem to be 
appropriate or fitting. The fittingness of the act, I said before, is the 
demonstration and proof of that act’s reasonable—that is, its 
judicious or prudential—character. The adequacy of the act with 
respect to what the situation requires, and what circumstances and  
 
 
27 Theodor Adorno, “Commitment” in Theodor Adorno et. al., Aesthetics and Politics (London: 
Verso, 1977). 




exigencies allow, is thus the emblem of the act’s exemplary value 
and power. Furthermore, in “apprehending this relation of 
agreement between the moral act and the situation, there is an effect 
of being drawn to follow”28 the example set by the act, so that we 
seek to imitate or emulate it. This effect, which Ricoeur points out is 
comparable to, or the analogical equivalent of, the work of art’s 
communicability, rests on our capacity to grasp the “rule” 
summoned by the act. Like the “idea” or “thought” that a work 
expresses, the act exemplifies this “rule” by virtue of the answer it 
provides to a problem or crisis. Here the force of the conviction 
that I attributed to the work’s power to come bursting into the 
midst of the real becomes the test of the convictions that we hold in 
light of the act’s exemplary value. Here, the increase in being under 
which Ricoeur places textual hermeneutics following the model of 
the work of art’s capacity to remake reality stands as the test of a 
deeper conviction that refuses to grant evil an ontological status.29 
The Law of Superabundance and the Logic of Hope 
The conviction that life’s abundance of meaning is more 
fundamental than the destructive forces that assail it sets the 
increase in being that Ricoeur identifies with the work’s mimetic 
refiguration of the real against the contagion of evil. Within the 
context of an aesthetic experience, this increase in being clearly 
depends on the reader, spectator or listener’s capacity to grasp the 
fit of the work. This capacity is inseparable from the operation 
through which the listener, for example, draws together the  
 
 
28 Ricoeur, Azouvi, and Launay, Critique and Conviction, 182. 
29 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004). Ricoeur places the “whole of textual hermeneutics…under 
the theme of the increase in being applied to the work of art” (ibid., 566). 




succession of tones that shapes the contours of the melody she 
hears. The listener’s apprehension of a tune or an air’s artful 
inflection is indicative of the kind of judgment on which the 
listener’s grasp of the melody’s meaningfulness depends. Following 
our earlier discussion of the metaphorical process’s iconic 
augmentation of the real, the listener, we could say, grasps the sense 
and meaning of the melody by schematizing it. In like fashion, a 
work’s mimetic redescription of affective dimensions of the 
listener’s affinity with the world turns on the communicability of the 
experience occasioned by the work. In the absence of the objective 
universality of determinant judgments, the communicability of this 
experience evinces a mode of judging in which the individual work 
exemplifies the “rule” to which it alone gives voice.  
By foregrounding the work’s exemplarity in this way, I especially 
want to highlight how the work brings about an increase in being 
through summoning the “rule” that I just identified with the 
listener’s apprehension of the fit of the work. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), one of the archaic definitions of the 
word “fit” is a “piece of music; [or] a strain.” Moreover, the OED 
defines a strain as a “musical sequence of sounds; a melody, a tune.” 
This definition not only provides etymological support for 
identifying the feelings or moods evoked by a tune with the unique 
arrangement of its constituent elements but it also points to the fact 
that the communicability of these feelings and moods rests in part 
on the listener’s ability to hear a succession of individual tones as 
comprising a tune or an air.30 There is no increase in being apart 
from the grasp of the fit of these tones through drawing a melodic  
 
 
30 Etymologically speaking, we could say that the listener apprehends a tune through grasping 
the fit of its constitutive elements.  




figure from their succession. In view of my previous remarks, we 
could conclude that the melody’s—or by extension a work’s—iconic 
augmentation of the real is the mark of this increase in being. 
Consequently, we could say that the conjunction of the work’s 
singularity and exemplarity is both a model of, and a testament to, 
the way that individual works—and by analogy, moral and political 
acts—provide handholds for hope through responding to problems, 
dilemmas, and crises in creative and imaginative ways. 
Tying hope to the responses that individual works, acts, and lives 
provide in answer to the difficulties and challenges that beset us 
undoubtedly has its risks. Individual responses to problems and 
crises clearly have the power to refashion the real in accordance with 
the alternatives they proffer. However, when it comes to the 
initiatives that we take, there are no guarantees that the courses of 
action that we pursue are in fact the right alternatives to, or remedies 
for, our social, moral, and political ills. Every solution to a problem 
or crisis in which good judgment prevails thus constitutes a kind of 
a wager. Ricoeur reminds us that the authors of the claim that we 
make history in circumstances that are not of our own choosing 
forget that we cannot anticipate all the consequences of our 
actions.31 Every initiative that we take runs the risk that the course 
of action we set in motion will come to nothing, that the ends we 
pursue will prove not to be the right ones, or that the unintended 
consequences of our actions will win out over our best intentions. 
We cannot allow ourselves to become paralyzed for fear of these 
risks and dangers if there is to be any hope of altering the world’s 
course, and of preventing the tension between the space of our  
experiences and the horizon of our expectation from rupturing  
 
 
31 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol. 3, 216.  




schismatically. Such a hope takes courage in exemplary works and 
acts. To be sure, this hope is one that is not only accompanied by 
risks and danger but also carries the force of our convictions as well 
as our aspirations. Hence like an eschatology of nonviolence, this 
hope takes root in exemplary works, acts, and lives that are 
promissory signs of the grace, goodness, generosity, and justice to 
which we aspire as “expressions of the freedom that we desire to 
be.”32 
The exemplary value of works and acts thus offers us an 
important clue as to why Ricoeur refuses to give evil an ontological 
status. Ricoeur’s remarks concerning the difference between good 
and evil merit citing at length: 
I have always resisted the idea that one could make a 
system of evil, that its manifestation could give rise to a 
summons. I am always struck, on the contrary, by its 
character of irruption and by the impossibility of 
comparing forms or magnitudes. Is it a prejudice to 
think that good gathers together, that expressions of 
the good gather themselves together, while those of evil 
scatter themselves? I do not believe that, even in its own 
manner, evil is cumulative and that there is in this order 
an equivalent of what I called, in connection with the 
good and the beautiful, a Nachfolge. For the 
transmission of evil, the only model we have is 
borrowed from biology; we think in terms of  
contamination, infection, epidemic. None of that is of the  
order of Nachfolge, of the communicability by means of 
 
32 Paul Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1980), 151. 




extreme singularity; in evil, there is no equivalence to 
the iconic augmentation performed by the beautiful.33 
The emphasis that Ricoeur places on the difference between the 
increase in being that results from exemplary works and acts and the 
contagion of evil is telling. Exemplary works and acts bring about an 
increase in being through iconically augmenting our ways of 
inhering in the world. In contrast, the spread of evil contaminates 
and defiles our relation with ourselves, with others, and with the 
world. The evil that comes into the world through the violence that 
one individual or group exercises over another here extends so far as 
to pollute our capacity to think for ourselves (about which Hannah 
Arendt had much to say), to contaminate our abilities to judge the 
adequacy of the examples that we elect to follow, and to corrupt our 
power to act in accordance with our considered convictions. 34 
Contrariwise, the summons that Ricoeur identifies with acts that we 
admire—acts of generosity, courage, and sacrifice in devotion to 
others—augments our being through gathering good together in 




33 Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 184 (original emphases). 
34 Exercising these capacities to think for ourselves and to judge accordingly presupposes the 
individual’s autonomy and its corollary, Bildung. Accordingly, the problem of evil, violence and 
domination raises the question of justice. 
35 See Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation. Ricoeur explains that the term testimony “should 
be applied to words, works, actions, and to lives which attest to an intention, an inspiration, an 
idea at the heart of experience and history which nonetheless transcend experience and history” 
(ibid., 119-120). For him, the irruption of the term’s religious meaning opens up an absolutely new 
dimension within the semantic complex of testimony’s profane senses. The originary affirmation 
that he opposes to the claim to absolute knowledge opens the way to the reciprocal relation 
between the “promotion of consciousness and the recognition of the absolute in its signs” (ibid., 
151). Accordingly, a hermeneutics of testimony and a criteriology of the divine, following Jean 
Nabert, are therefore as inseparable as are exteriority and height. Exteriority and height are also 
inseparable to the extent that one’s conscience cannot bring about the divestment of one’s ego 
“without the testimony of certain acts, certain lives, that, despite their radical contingency, their 
plain historicity, speak in the name of the absolute” (ibid., 116). See also my “Aesthetic Experience, 
Mimesis and Testimony,” Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 3, no. 1 (2012). 




act’s communicability. As handholds for hope acts, like works, thus 
distinguish themselves from the irruption of evil through holding 
out the possibility of a different, more just and even more peaceable 
future. 
Is it a prejudice to set the ontological vehemence of works and 
acts that augment our inherence in the world against the scourge of 
forces and powers that corrupt and destroy relations among human 
beings? In view of the foregoing discussion, the question does not 
necessarily demand a theological response. Rather, this prejudice—if 
we can even call it that—draws support from the way that singular 
acts and works turn our regard for the examples that they set toward 
our future expectations. As signs of as yet unrealized possibilities 
and potentialities, works and acts that provide models we can follow 
ignite the passion for the possible and fuel different social, political, 
and religious movements’ drive for change. 36  Consequently, this 
passion and this drive animate the logic that bridges between the 
condition of the possibility of possibilities (that is, the future) and 
the capacity that we have to break with congealed habits, practices, 
and systems of thought through responding to problems and crises 
in novel ways. 
The claim that, as the condition of the possibility of possibilities, 
the future is in some way dependent upon our powers of judgment 
and invention seems to be a large one. And yet, how can we 
preserve the tension between a past that has already been surpassed 
and a horizon of dawning possibilities that breaks open the space of 
our experiences with the promise of a brighter future apart from the 
ways that we exercise these powers? Our belief in our ability to  
 
 
36 See Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel 
Anderson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995). 




exercise these powers is critically decisive. For, as Ricoeur points 
out, to believe that we are able is already to be able to act, to speak, 
to tell one’s own story, and to hold ourselves accountable for the 
things that we do.37 Power, he therefore tells us, affirms and declares 
itself. The “affirmation of a power to act…presents a noteworthy 
feature that cannot be proven, [or] demonstrated, but can only be 
attested.”38 Hence the belief in our own abilities rests on a practical 
conviction concerning, and a confidence in, our capacities. We attest 
that we have these capacities through exercising them in conjunction 
with the approbation that we receive from others. Hence we only 
overcome the doubts or suspicions that we have regarding our 
abilities to think and judge for ourselves, and to affect the course of 
the events in which we are caught up through a leap—a sursum—
aided by an appeal to the responsibility that we have as historical 
actors and agents.39 
The practical conviction that we are capable of intervening in the 
world’s course brings us to the question I posed at the outset: Does 
Ricoeur’s eschatology of nonviolence rest on theological 
presuppositions regarding the “end times” and the promise of 
salvation? This conviction, it seems to me now, rests squarely on the 
belief—or better, the hope—that the future and the possibilities it 
still holds are not yet closed to us. Exemplary acts and works are 
springs of this hope. Consequently, the excess of meaning unleashed 
by these works and acts is the sign of their superabundance in the 
face of debilitating fears, forces and powers. It may be that hope 
seems at first to be irrational when applied to the field of human 
 
37 Paul Ricoeur, Reflections on the Just, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 76. 
38 Ibid., 75. 
39 Ibid. See especially Ricoeur’s remarks on the place of moral, juridical, or political pedagogy 
and education. 




existence. 40  At the same time, hope’s practical and existential 
necessity inheres in the structure of action insofar as the possibility 
of intervening in the world’s course is still a real one.41 The structure 
of action joins our experiences of expectations that have already 
been met to as yet unrealized expectations, aspirations, and 
demands. Consequently, this structure constitutes the conceptual 
framework of freedom’s actualization. For Ricoeur, the concept of 
freedom’s actualization links the dimension of realized 
accomplishments with that of unfulfilled demands. Hence for him, 
the “kind of dialectic that rules the relation between freedom and its 
full actualization”42 is the philosophical equivalent of hope’s law of 
superabundance. 
This equivalence between the kind of dialectic ruling over the 
relation between freedom and its actualization and the law of 
superabundance might seem to call into question my entire 
undertaking. And yet, the idea of freedom that animates this 
dialectic charges practical reason with the task of freedom’s 
actualization within the context of our historical condition. 
Freedom, Ricoeur tells us, “is the capacity to live according to the 
paradoxical law of superabundance, of denying death and asserting 
the excess of sense over non-sense in all desperate situations.”43 It  
 
 
40 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 205. For Ricoeur, “the authentic rationality of hope can be 
grasped nowhere else than at the end of this ‘absurd logic’’’ (ibid.) named by Kierkegaard.  
41 This possibility is the condition of the power we exercise when we take the initiative to act 
in ways that we anticipate will lead to a better or at least less unjust future. 
42 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 216. Hegel’s system is “one that is written from the end toward 
the beginning” (ibid., 208), such that its rationality coincides with the system’s recapitulation of the 
whole in an eternal present. Ricoeur explains that “there is nothing new in absolute knowledge; it 
merely concludes the reconciliation already at work in the successive phases of the philosophical 
process between certitude and truth” (ibid.) Hence the “end is not something that could be 
awaited or expected—it is the eternal present of thought that sustains the history of thought…. 
Absolute knowledge is this divine thought that Aristotle called noēsis noēseths, the thought of 
thought” (ibid.). 
 43Ibid., 207. 




may well be that hope’s authentic rationality can only be grasped at 
the end of an “absurd logic,”44 when the reason for hope reveals 
itself in the excess of meaning that overflows an event, act or work. 
Ricoeur comments that St. Paul “is the first thinker who tried to 
elaborate an existential interpretation of the two central 
Christological events: the cross and the resurrection.” 45  Paul’s 
interpretation is at root antinomic, for it sets the “death of the old 
human being…[against the] rebirth of the new one. ”46 That this 
“second birth is the eschatological event in existential terms,” 47 
however, reserves a place for this event’s practical dimension at the 
heart of an eschatology of nonviolence aimed at the actualization of 
freedom within the historical reality of humankind. 
Since it cannot be subsumed under a logic of identity, this 
eschatological event thus opens the door to hope’s philosophical 
meaning. To be sure, a theology of hope is centered on this event. 
For such a theology, the “hope of things to come” 48  takes 
precedence and rules over exegetical concepts of logos or 
manifestation. The eschatological event therefore can only be 
expressed “as a break, as a leap, as a new creation, as a wholly 
other.”49 The advent of the new clearly belongs to the logic of hope. 
According to this logic, the rule of sense over non-sense prevails. 
The conviction that good gathers together holds to this rule. The 
“excess of sense over non-sense”50 is therefore the key to a logic of  
 
 
44 Ibid., 205. 
45 Ibid., 206. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.: “[T]his eschatological event cannot be expressed by the means of a logic of identity. 
We must express it as a break, as a leap, as a new creation, as a wholly other.” 
48 Ibid., 204. 
49 Ibid., 206. 
50 Ibid., 207. For Ricoeur, the law of superabundance is therefore the key to this logic of 
existence.  




existence fueled by the demand for the “not yet” and the “much 
more.” The logic of hope is accordingly a “logic of increase and 
superabundance” 51  that draws support from exemplary acts and 
lives that bear the mark of the future through testifying proleptically 
to the coming reign of goodness, generosity, courage, and love. 
In the end, the intelligibility of hope countermands the idea that 
we could develop a rational system that would bind thought and 
action to history’s ultimate reason and meaning. It may be, as 
Ricoeur says, that “I hope in order to understand.”52 For him, the 
superabundance of meaning over the profusion of senseless 
destruction and failure gives rise to thought. By setting the passion 
for the possible against the sadness of our mortal condition, hope 
becomes the wellspring of our freedom and of our power to affect 
the world’s course. The projection of the task of actualizing this 
freedom is accordingly the philosophical equivalent of a theology of 
hope. As such, setting an eschatology of nonviolence in place of the 
critique of ideology is this theology’s most adequate philosophical 
approximation.53  The task of making freedom a reality for those 
who are victims of violence, terror, injustice, exploitation, 
oppression and modern-day slavery takes root in our affirmation of 
the possibility of a better and more just world. Through embracing 
this possibility, we adopt this task as our own. 
*   *   * 
I would like to offer a few final remarks by way of a postscript. 
The analogy between the logic of hope’s religious or theological  
impulse and an eschatology of freedom clearly rests on our capacity  
 
 
51 Ibid., 206. 
52 Ibid., 207. The phrase is a translation of the Latin Spero ut intelligam. 
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to reinvigorate our practices and way of living in creative and 
imaginative ways. In this sense exemplary works, lives, and acts 
augment the practical field of our everyday experiences. Such works, 
lives and acts bring about an increase in being by transcending the 
real from within. This transcendence from within the real is the 
source of an excess that overflows the work or the act like a trail of 
fire. Exemplary works, lives, and acts thus stand as a kind of surety 
of the logic of hope. 
The philosophical equivalence between the projection of the task 
of making freedom a reality and a theology of hope, however, has its 
limits. For one thing, a philosophy of hope invariably runs up 
against our theoretical and practical limitation when it comes to the 
knowledge we have and the foresight with which we act. More 
crucially still, setting the passion for the possible against a 
complacency toward sadness and despair sends us back to the 
question of the source, origin or wellspring of hope. In a way, the 
question concerning the source of hope reprises the one I asked at 
the outset. At the same time, this new question opens a space for 
relating hope to the givenness or the gift of existence.54 Whatever  
religious or theological significance we might attach to the existential 
or ontological ground of our mortal  condition, the “Joy of Yes in 
 
54  The avowal of the givenness of existence is the spring of the affirmation of this gift. 
Ricoeur explains that “every religion claims to give a human answer to a questioning that comes 
from above, from a higher level than the human” (Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur, What 
Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain, 
trans. M. B. DeBevoise [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000], 269). Marianne Moyaert 
points out that for Ricoeur, this moment of transcendence is the vanishing point of the religious 
phenomenon of a “foundation without foundation” (fond sans fond), which constitutes a limit idea 
for “understanding the illimitable condition of religious experience.” Marianne Moyaert, “From 
Religious Violence to Interreligious Hospitality,” in Paul Ricoeur in the Age of Hermeneutical Reason: 
Poetics, Praxis and Critique, ed. Roger W. H. Savage (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2015); see Paul 
Ricoeur, “Religious Belief: The Difficult Path to the Religious,” in A Passion for the Possible: Thinking 
with Paul Ricoeur, ed. Brian Treanor and Henry Venema (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2010); Paul Ricoeur, “What Ontology In View?” in Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen 
Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. 




the sadness of the finite”55 remains hope’s answer to all amor fati. It 
is perhaps worth noting that Ricoeur once said: “Joy is the only 
mood worthy of being called ontological.”56 Through affirming that 
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